In the Process of Controverting Its Constitutionally Given Purpose the U.S. Patent System Discriminates against Inventors with Limited Financial Means by Calloway, Valerie
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice
Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 9
1993
In the Process of Controverting Its Constitutionally
Given Purpose the U.S. Patent System
Discriminates against Inventors with Limited
Financial Means
Valerie Calloway
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.
Recommended Citation
Valerie Calloway, In the Process of Controverting Its Constitutionally Given Purpose the U.S. Patent System Discriminates against Inventors
with Limited Financial Means, 11 Law & Ineq. 565 (1993).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol11/iss2/9
In the Process of Controverting Its
Constitutionally Given Purpose the
U.S. Patent System Discriminates




In 1963 Robert Kearns invented an intermittent windshield
wiper.' He was a graduate student at the time, with a wife and
four children, spending a considerable portion of his small income
on wiper components. 2 When it came time to patent his invention,
he did not have the resources to pay for preparing and filing a pat-
ent application.3 However, Kearns was more fortunate than other
independent inventors in that he had a friend who was able and
willing to pay for the patent application in exchange for the patent
rights.4 Kearns had the opportunity to reclaim his patent rights
several years later.5
Not all independent inventors are so fortunate. Many lack the
financial resources to obtain patent rights. Others do not have the
financial resources to defend their patent rights, once they get
them. As the costs of obtaining a patent rise, and as more of those
costs must be borne by the patent applicant, independent inventors
with limited financial resources will become a thing of the past.
Recent legislative acts indicate that the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (Office) is on its way to becoming fully user-
funded.6 In order to become fully user-funded, the Office is increas-
ing its patent application processing charges, requiring fees to
* The author received her B.S. in Chemical Engineering from the University of
Virginia in 1988. She will receive her J.D. from the University of Minnesota in 1994.
1. John Seabrook, The Flash of Genius, NEW YORKER, Jan. 11, 1993, at 38, 42.
2. Id. at 44.
3. Id. at 45.
4. Id. at 44-45.
5. Id. at 47.
6. See supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text; see also Act of Dec. 12, 1980,
Pub. L. 96-517, 94 stat. 3015, 3017 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1988))
(indicating amendments to make the office user-funded).
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maintain a patent for the maximum seventeen-year period, and ad-
ding surcharges to the current fees. Unfortunately, the Office has
failed to provide alternate payment plans for inventors with limited
financial means.
Because the Office has continued to raise costs without provid-
ing alternate payment plans for inventors with limited financial re-
sources, the patent system functionally prohibits small entities
with limited financial means from obtaining U.S. patents. This pro-
hibition occurs even if inventors with limited financial means are
capable of paying a patent attorney or agent to prepare their patent
applications. This prohibition is discriminatory because among in-
ventors with patentable inventions, financial viability alone can de-
termine who has access to Constitutionally given patent rights.7 In
addition, this prohibition is contrary to the Office's Constitutional
purpose of promoting the advancement of science and technology.8
Part I of this article discusses the history and purpose of the
U.S. patent system. Part II discloses the costs associated with ob-
taining a patent. Part III reviews options for inventors with limited
financial means to offset these costs. Part IV discusses how these
costs make the patent system discriminatory against inventors
with limited financial means and how this discrimination under-
mines the purpose of the U.S. patent system. Part V suggests pat-
ent system modifications that would minimize this discrimination
and, in the process, further the advancement of science and
technology.
Part I: History and Purpose of the U.S. Patent System
The advancement of technology is essential to the survival of
the American economy. This country's founders foresaw the impor-
tance of technological advancement and authorized the U.S. Con-
gress "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. . . ."9 Technol-
ogy cannot be advanced if inventors expend energy inventing the
same items repeatedly, if inventors have no incentive to invent, or if
society does not know about items that already have been invented.
Congress, therefore, promotes the advancement of technology by
discouraging secrecy, encouraging public invention disclosures, and
creating conditions in which expending the funds and energy to de-
7. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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velop improvements and new devices will be warranted.l 0 Thus,
the U.S. patent system is premised upon the idea that if people dis-
close inventions and improvements, then science and technology
will advance.1
To encourage public disclosure, Congress enacted the 1790 Act
to promote the progress of the useful arts.12 This Act gave inven-
tors or their assigns, administrators, or heirs the right to exclude
others for up to 14 years from "making, constructing, using, and
vending to others" a patented invention.' 3 Public disclosure was to
be evidenced by submission of a patent application and grant of a
patent.14
A patent issuance, even today, is considered a contract be-
tween the inventor(s) and society. Society's consideration for this
contract is to give the inventor the right to exclude others, via the
court system, from making, using, or selling the invention for a lim-
ited time. The inventor's consideration is prompt public disclosure
of an invention that in some way promotes the progress of science
and technology. 15
Pursuant to the Act of 1790, the Secretary of State, Attorney
General, and Secretary of War determined whether an invention
"promoted the progress of the useful arts."' 6 An invention pro-
moted the progress of the useful arts if it was sufficiently useful and
important.17 Because these heads of state did not have the time to
perform the usual duties of their offices and grant patents, very few
patents were granted.' 8 This lack of attention to the patent system
enraged inventors and encouraged them to convince Congress to re-
peal the 1790 Act and pass the 1793 Act.19
10. S. Doc. No. 21, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1957).
11. The Congress promotes the progress of science and technology indirectly by
providing for inventors to be secure in their right of exclusivity for a limited time.
The single and sole object of the patent system is to promote progress and promoting
progress "necessitates a prompt disclosure of the invention . . . to the public."
F.W.H. Clay, The Relation of the Examiner to the Inventor and His Attorney, 1 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 9 (1918).
12. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2212 (1834).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Clay, supra note 11, at 14-15.
16. 12 CONG. DEB., Part IV, App. 101 (1836). The Act provided for the decision to
be made by any two of these three officials. Id.
17. Id.
18. H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1952).
19. 3 ANNALs OF CONG. App. 1432 (1849). The Act was passed at the insistence of
the industrial classes because only three patents were granted during the first year
of the 1790 Act, and only 60 were granted during the few years this Act was law.
William I. Wyman, The Patent Act of 1836, 1 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 203 (1919).
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The Act of 1793 essentially established an Invention Registra-
tion System. "[P]atents were granted to anyone who applied on ful-
filling the formal requirements and filing the necessary papers and
fees."20 No examination was required, and "the attributes of the
patent [were] ascertained only by expensive litigation." 2x This re-
gistration system promulgated questions of patent originality, du-
plication, and frivolousness. Because no one in the patent system
assured that the disclosures were new and useful, the courts be-
came overburdened with litigation during the forty years the 1793
Act was in effect. Only litigation determined the value and attrib-
utes of a patented invention.22
The 1793 Act precipitated the following problems: worthless
patents that infringed upon each other; patent monopolies that in-
vaded the rights of bona fide patentees; lawsuits that burdened the
court system; and fraud by persons copying inventions in the Of-
fice's model room.23 In response to these problems, Congress en-
acted the Patent Act of 1836,24 which serves as the foundation of
present U.S. patent law. The 1836 Act created the Office, headed
by a Commissioner of Patents, and staffed examiners who examine
patent applications.25
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to pro-
mote the advancement of science and technology. Congress does
this by encouraging public disclosure of inventions. Congress en-
courages public disclosure of inventions by overseeing a patent sys-
tem that rewards inventors with the right to exclude others in
exchange for prompt public disclosure of inventions. However,
since the 1980 amendments, acquisition of this reward is dependent
not only upon public disclosure of a patentable invention but also
upon the payment of fees.
20. H.R. REP. No. 1923, supra note 18, at 5.
21. Wyman, supra note 19, at 203-204.
22. Id. The Act of 1793 gave no power to the Secretary of State or any other
heads of state to refuse a patent for lack of novelty or usefulness. 'The only inquiry
[was], whether the terms and forms prescribed [were] complied with. The granting
of patents, therefore, [was] but a ministerial duty." 12 CONG. DEB., supra note 16.
The term useful as used in the 1793 Act became synonymous with not "hurtful, inju-
rious or pernicious." Id. Because so many patents were worthless under this 1793
Act, the U.S. patent system's purpose, to encourage the promotion of science and
technology, was undermined. Wyman, supra note 19, at 206.
23. 12 CONG. DEB., supra note 16.
24. 12 CONG. DEB., Part IV, app. xl (1836). Prior to 1836, the acts to promote the
progress of the useful arts became Patent Acts.
25. H.R. REP. No. 1923, supra note 18, at 4-5.
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Part II: Costs of Obtaining a U.S. Patent
There have always been fees associated with obtaining a U.S.
patent.26 Presently, patent application preparation costs and Of-
fice fees are the two major costs associated with obtaining a U.S.
patent. To ensure that the invention meets all preliminary patent-
ability requirements 27 and that the patent application satisfies all
formal requirements, 28 inventors should hire a patent attorney or
patent agent prior to filing for a patent.29 In addition, the Office
requires payment of patent application processing and utility pat-
26. The original Patent Act, the 1790 Act to promote the progress of the useful
arts, required patentees to pay fees for petition receiving and filing, specification
filing, patent preparation, seal affixing, and patent delivery before receiving their
patents. 2 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 12, at 2214. If a patent was not granted,
then payment of the patent preparation, seal affixing, and patent delivery fees were
not required. Id.
27. A patentable invention must be a new, useful, and nonobvious process,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter or any new, useful, and nonobvious
improvement thereof. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 103 (1988). In addition, the invention's
patentability must not be barred by any of the conditions listed in 35 U.S.C. § 102
(1988). These conditions include:
(a) the invention must not have been known or used by others in this country, or
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country before the
invention thereof by the applicant for the patent; or
(b) the invention must not have been patented or described in a printed publication
in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for the patent in the United States; or
(c) the invention must not have been abandoned; or
(d) the invention must not have been patented or caused to be patented or was the
subject of an inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives in a
foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an
application for patent or inventor's certificate filed more than twelve months before
the filing of the application in the United States; or
(e) the invention must not have been described in a patent granted on an application
for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the
applicant for patent, or on an international application by another before the inven-
tion thereof by the applicant for patent; or
(f) the inventor himself or herself did not invent the subject matter sought to be
patented; or,
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country by
another who has not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it.
28. A patent application must be made by the inventor and shall include a speci-
fication as prescribed by 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988), a drawing as prescribed by 35
U.S.C. § 113 (1988) and a declaration of inventorship as prescribed by 35 U.S.C.
§ 115 (1988). 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988).
29. A patent agent is a person who is registered to practice before the Office but
is not admitted to the bar. A patent attorney is a person who is admitted to the bar
and who is registered to practice before the Office.
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ent maintenance fees to obtain and maintain a utility patent3 O for
the statutory seventeen-year period.31
Patent Application Preparation Costs
In the patent application process, the first costs inventors in-
cur are the patent attorney or agent costs. The cost for a patent
attorney or agent to prepare a patent application is usually based
upon an hourly rate. The charge per hour depends upon the attor-
ney's or agent's years of experience, geographical location, and area
of technical expertise. The number of hours inventors need of the
attorney's or agent's time depends upon the complexity of the in-
vention, the amount of preliminary work the inventors have al-
ready done,3 2 whether inventors want a patent search done prior to
the filing of their patent applications, and the ease with which the
patent application can be prosecuted.3 3 In addition, inventors may
have to pay a draftsperson to prepare drawings which supplement
the patent application. These patent application preparation costs
can easily total many thousands of dollars. 34 If inventors cannot
30. There are three types of patents: design, plant, and utility. A design patent
protects the design of an article. A plant patent protects a new plant variety. A
utility patent protects a new, useful, and nonobvious article of manufacture, process,
machine or composition of matter. BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 778 (abr. 6th ed. 1991).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1988). The statutory exclusionary period for a utility patent
is 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
32. The amount of preliminary work an inventor can do may range from nothing
to writing the specification (text that supports the claimed invention) and claims (see
supra note 55 and accompanying text) of the patent application. Inventors are not
required to have a patent attorney or agent write and prosecute (see supra note 33)
their patent applications. Inventors may write and prosecute their own patent ap-
plications. However, it is very difficult for inventors, who are not trained in the pat-
ent examining procedure and the patent laws, to ensure that their inventions are
properly claimed, and therefore protected, without some consultation with a patent
attorney or agent. Jerry Lemelson, the independent inventor with more patents
than anyone else presently living, states: "It takes great skill to craft a patent appli-
cation.... You have to stake the four corners of your invention broadly enough so
that they give you maximum protection.... Of course, if you write it too broadly you
may invalidate your claim, because it will read on prior art. But if you write too
narrowly you may miss the thing about the technology that turns out to be truly
valuable." Seabrook, supra note 1, at 50 (quoting Jerry Lemelson).
33. Prosecution is a patent law term of art that identifies the process of filing a
patent application and receiving a patent. Patent prosecution usually entails: in-
ventors or their authorized representatives filing a patent application; the Office re-
sponding via an Office Action; the inventors or their representatives responding to
the Office Action, if necessary; and the Office replying with a final Office Action. The
final Office Action is either an allowance of a patent or a final rejection of the patent
application's disclosure as unpatentable. If the patent application is amended or ex-
tensions of time or additional interactions with the Office are needed, the inventors
must pay for more hours of the attorney's or agent's time.
34. The cost per hour for a patent attorney in the Twin Cities area of Minnesota
ranges from $100 to $250 per hour. The cost of a patent agent ranges from $50 to
$125 per hour. A patent application usually takes a minimum of ten hours to write.
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pay these fees, they cannot obtain patent applications, and there-
fore, cannot obtain U.S. Patents.
Office Costs
Inventors must also pay Office fees, and in 1980, Congress en-
acted legislation requiring the Commissioner of Patents to increase
fees in order to ensure that the Office's utility patent application
process would be 25% user-funded.3 5 The fees were to increase so
that by 1982 the utility patent application fees were to recover 25%
of the patent applications' processing cost to the Office. 36 In addi-
tion, by 1982, fees for all other patent related services or materials
were to "recover the estimated average cost to the Office of perform-
ing the service or furnishing the material."3 7 In other words, all
patent-related services and materials, other than application
processing, were to be 100% user-funded. 38
This 1980 legislation also established utility patent mainte-
nance fees. After a utility patent is issued, maintenance fees must
be paid at three years and six months, seven years and six months,
and eleven years and six months in order to keep the patent from
expiring prior to the seventeen-year statutory period.3 9 By fiscal
A patentability search to see if there are patents or publications disclosing the inven-
tor's invention can easily cost $750. In addition, a draftsperson usually charges
about $100 per sheet of drawings. The number of sheets required depends upon the
complexity of the invention. Complex mechanical inventions may require five to
twelve sheets and less complex inventions may require one to five sheets. Interview
with Grady Frenchick, patent attorney and Adjunct Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota (Oct. 29, 1992).
35. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3017 (codified as amended
at 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)). This legislation also requires that the design patent appli-
cation process be 50% user-funded. Id.
36. Id. at 3017. All of the filing through disposition utility patent application
fees are to recover 25% of the Office's patent application processing cost. Disposition
may be by issuance or abandonment. Id.
37. Id.
38. Patent related services and materials, other than patent application process-
ing, include items such as: printing and distributing upon request Office public in-
formation pamphlets; copying and sending upon request file wrappers, which are a
record of all the interactions between the Office and the inventors or their represent-
atives prior to a patent being granted; storing documents at inventors' requests that
verify dates of inventions, recording assignments of patent rights, and filing certifi-
cates of correction.
39. Id. There is a grace period of six months to pay utility patent maintenance
fees. Design patents do not have maintenance fees. Id. Many inventors are receiv-
ing profits or royalties from their utility patents by the time their maintenance fees
are due. These inventors usually have no trouble paying their maintenance fees.
However, there are other inventors whose patented inventions are not financially
successful for decades. John Reilly, Impact of the New Patent and Trademark Fee
Bill: What Hath Been Wrought?, 65 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 166, 173 (1983). The inven-
tors with limited financial means and no commercially successful patent have
trouble paying the maintenance fees. Inventions that are not commercially success-
19931
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year 1996, these maintenance fees will recover from Office users
another 25% of the estimated Office cost to process utility patent
applications. 40 The Commissioner of Patents has the authority to
adjust the fees every three years to recover 50% of the cost for util-
ity patent application processing and 100% for all other Office serv-
ices and materials.41
The 1980 legislation was enacted during a time of heightened
concern about the United States losing its first and second place
exporter status.4 2 Congress believed that the weaknesses in the
patent system, caused by the Office's under-funding, contributed to
the country's declining export status.4 3 "[This bill] represents an
effort to reverse the current decline in U.S. productivity by
strengthening the patent and copyright systems.... ."44 Further,
this legislation was enacted to "strengthen the financial resources
of the Patent Office. . . ."45 Congress did not, however, seriously
consider whether this fee restructuring would promote the advance-
ment of science and technology by encouraging public disclosure of
inventions. Congress apparently thought that if the Office was bet-
ter funded, patents would be dispositioned more quickly and there
would be a greater incentive to publicly disclose inventions. 4 6
In enacting the 1980 legislation, Congress did consider the
fact that some inventors would not be able to publicly disclose their
inventions because they were incapable of paying the increased
fees. 47 In spite of Congress' concern for inventors unable to pay the
fees, the resulting Act of 1980 encouraged only those with the abil-
ful within a decade are just as important as those inventions that are an immediate
commercial success. Those inventions that are not commercially successful within a
decade may become commercially successful within two decades or serve as building
blocks for subsequent inventions that exhibit immediate commercial success.
40. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3017 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 41 (b)).
41. Id.
42. 126 CONG. REc. 12,983 (1980).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 29,895 (1980).
45. Id.
46. One of the four major thrusts of this 1980 legislation was to strengthen the
financial resources of the Office "to provide fast and accurate processing of patent
applications by revising the fee structure of the Office." Id.
47. In the House during discussion of the 1980 legislation just prior to its pass-
ing, one representative raised the concern that overall the patent fees would double
in order to cover 50% of the cost to process the patent application. The Judiciary
Committee Chairperson replied that over the life of the patent the fees would double
with this new legislation. Ohio Congressman, Mr. Miller, stated:
I am concerned that if inventors who are not with large corporations
but are on their own come up with some new expertise or new technol-
ogy, that they may not be in a position to afford to patent that idea.... I
am concerned about independent inventors or small businessmen who
will apply for patents in the future. If they cannot afford to pay the
[Vol. 11:565
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ity to pay the fees to publicly disclose their inventions. Inventors
who could not pay the fees were actually discouraged from publicly
disclosing their inventions because they knew that they could not
afford to pay the patent application preparation and Office fees.
In 1982, the concern about the effects of the increased fees on
inventors with limited financial means encouraged Congress to cre-
ate the "small entity" discount for patent application processing and
patent maintenance fees.4 S Small entities49 now pay 50% of the
increase [sic] fee, will we be preventing them from helping us to develop
new technologies ... ?
Id. at 29,900 (1980). The Judiciary Committee Chairperson, Mr. Kastenmeier,
agreed with the Ohio Representative's statements and answered his question in the
affirmative. The Committee Chairperson then replied that Congress oversees the
fee increases so the House and Senate will monitor the increases. The legislation
was then passed. Id.
48. Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. 97-247, 96 Stat. 317 (creating a small entity
discount for patent processing and maintenance fees for those who qualify). Patent
application processing fees include fees for the following: filing a patent application,
including excess claims in a patent application, patent issuance, patent reissue, dis-
claimer filing, appeal from the examiner to the Board of Appeals, revival of an unin-
tentionally abandoned application, and petition for extension of time. Maintenance
fees include the fees payable three and one-half years, seven and one-half years, and
eleven and one-half years after a utility patent issues. 35 U.S.C. § 41(a) and (b)
(1988). All of these fees are not paid with every patent application. Every utility
patent application requires payment of at least the filing fee and excess claim fees, if
more than a certain number of claims are needed to define the invention. The issu-
ance and maintenance fees are required if the patent is granted.
49. Small entities include "independent inventors and nonprofit organizations as
defined in regulations established by the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks,
and small business concerns as defined in section 3 of the Small Business Act and by
regulations established by the Small Business Administration." Act of Aug. 27,
1982, Pub. L. 97-247, 96 Stat. 317.
The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure defines a small entity as "an in-
dependent inventor, a small business concern or a nonprofit organization." Manual
of Pat. Examining Proc. § 1.9(f). This Manual defines an independent inventor as
any inventor
who (1) has not assigned, granted, conveyed, or licensed, and (2) is
under no obligation under contract or law to assign, grant, convey, or
license, any rights in the invention to any person who could not likewise
be classified as an independent inventor if that person had made the
invention, or to any concern which would not qualify as a small busi-
ness concern or nonprofit organization under this section.
Id. at (c). A small business concern is any business concern that does not have more
than 500 employees and that has not
assigned, granted, conveyed or licensed, and is under no obligation
under contract or law to assign, grant, or license any rights in the in-
vention to any person who could not be classified as an independent
inventors if that person had made the invention, or to any concern
which would not qualify as a small business concern or a nonprofit or-
ganization under this section.
Id. at (d) (citing 13 C.F.R. § 121.12 (1989)). A nonprofit organization is a "university
or other institution of higher education located in any country," a tax exempt organi-
zation, or any "nonprofit science or educational organization qualified under a non-
profit organization statute of a state of this country," and any nonprofit organization
1993]
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standard patent application processing and patent maintenance
fees.5 0 The effect of this discount, however, has been negated be-
cause in 1990 Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act, which imposes a 69% surcharge on all patent processing and
maintenance fees. 5 1 The Commissioner of Patents now determines
what the patent processing and maintenance fees need to be to re-
cover up to 50%52 of the actual costs to process a patent application.
For fiscal years 1991 through 1995, the Commissioner will add a
69% surcharge to those fees. 53 This added surcharge was a re-
sponse to the Senate Judiciary Committee's recommendation that
the Office's patent application processing be 100% user-funded.5 4
At the end of 1992, the filing fee for each utility patent appli-
cation, regardless of the number of claims,55 was $500.56 If the pat-
ent application contained more than three independent claims,
there was a charge of $52 for each claim in excess of three.57 Fur-
thermore, if there were more than 20 claims in the patent applica-
tion, then there was an added fee of $14 for each claim in excess of
20.58 There was also a $160 fee for each application containing a
multiple dependent claim.5 9 For an invention of any complexity,
in another country that would qualify as a nonprofit organization if located in this
country. Id. at (e).
50. Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. 97-247, 96 Stat. 317.
51. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388,
1388-391 (Plan enacted to help reconcile the budget for 1991).
52. According to the 1980 legislation, the Office is to increase the maintenance
fees to ensure that by fiscal year 1996 they will recover 25% of the actual patent
application processing costs for the Office. Therefore, before fiscal year 1996 the
total costs recovered by the Office may not have reached 50%. See supra notes 39
and 40, and accompanying text. That is why the Commissioner will determine what
the patent processing and maintenance fees should be to recover up to 50% of the
actual Office costs to process a patent application. Design patents do not have main-
tenance fees so their patent processing costs alone must recover 50% of the actual
patent processing costs to the Office. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat.
3015, 3017 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
53. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388,
1388-391.
54. H.R. REP. No. 881, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 159 (1990) (in order to eliminate
$495 million from its budget, the Senate Judiciary Committee recommended that
users fully fund the Office.).
55. The claims are the last set of numbered paragraphs in a patent application.
Claims legally define the invention especially for infringement purposes. BLACK's
LAw DICTIONARY 169 (abr. 6th ed. 1991).
56. Act of Sept. 7, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-367, § 41, 1992 U.S.C.C.AN. (106 Stat.)
1021 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1993)).
57. Id.
58. Id. This $14 fee per claim applies regardless of whether the claims are de-
pendent or independent. Id.
59. Id. A dependent claim contains a reference to a previously listed claim and
then specifies a further limitation on the claimed subject matter. A multiple depen-
dent claim contains a reference, in the alternative, to more than one claim previously
listed and then specifies a further limitation. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
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even a small entity would have to pay between $300 and $500 just
to file a patent application.
If a utility patent application is filed and a patent granted,
then the patent issue fee was $820.60 The maintenance fees to keep
the patent from expiring during its seventeen-year life totalled
$3,940.61 Even with the 50% discount, small entities would be
charged about $2,500 for issuance and maintenance of a utility pat-
ent.6 2 To file for, obtain, and maintain a utility patent, a small en-
tity must pay approximately $3,000. This total does not include
charges required if the inventor appeals a patent examiner's rejec-
tion. It also does not include the expense of prosecuting a utility
patent application for a more complex invention. Overall, small en-
tities must pay at least $5,00063 to apply for, obtain, and maintain
their patent rights.
Part III: Means for Inventors with Limited Financial
Resources to Offset or Minimize Costs
Presently, there are very few options available for avoiding or
offsetting the costs of filing for, obtaining, and maintaining a utility
patent. There is only one statutory provision for fee waiver in the
patent laws.64 This statutory provision allows a government de-
partment, agency, or official to request a fee waiver for "any service
or material related to patents."65
If inventors' maintenance fee payments are late and the in-
ventors prove the delay was unavoidable, then the Commissioner
has the discretion to cancel the expiration of the inventors' pat-
ents.6 6 However, there are no statutory provisions for Office fee
waivers for entities other than the Government.
Since the law is void of any patent fee waiver provisions for
inventors with limited financial means, assistance in reducing the
cost of patent application preparation should be available from an
alternate source, such as an American Bar Association-affiliated
pro bono Program, an American Intellectual Property Lawyer Asso-
ciation-affiliated sliding-fee scale program, or a Legal Aid Society
60. Act of Sept. 7, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-367, § 41, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.)
1021 (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1993)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. This total includes the cost of patent application preparation.
64. 35 U.S.C. § 41(e) (1988).
65. Id. "The Commissioner [of Patents] may waive the payment of any fee for
any service or material related to patents in connection with an occasional or inci-
dental request made by a department or agency of the Government, or any officer
thereof." Id.
66. 35 U.S.C. § 41(c) (1988).
1993]
Law and Inequality
program. However, none of these organizations sponsors programs
that assist inventors with obtaining patent applications for a re-
duced fee that each inventor can reasonably afford to pay.67
The final option available to offset the costs of obtaining a pat-
ent is acquisition of a financial supporter who will pay all fees in
exchange for the rights to the invention. This option is risky be-
cause the more people who see and hear about an invention before
it is patented the greater the opportunity for the invention to be
misappropriated.6 8 To obtain financial support, inventors may
have to disclose their inventions to several people and/or organiza-
tions. Large organizations may require inventors to make
presentations to several managers before deciding to fund the ac-
quisition of a patent. In addition, inventors may have to disclose
67. The Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis, in Hennepin County, Minnesota, does
not have the resources to keep a patent attorney on staff. It refers requests for such
services to the Legal Advice Clinics. Telephone Interview with Jeremy Lane, Execu-
tive Director, Minneapolis Legal Aid Society (Sept. 30, 1992).
Hennepin County Bar Association-Legal Advice Clinics, Ltd. (LAC) is a non-
profit corporation in Hennepin County which provides free legal services to eligible,
low-income clients through volunteer attorneys. LAC screens clients for financial
eligibility and then refers eligible clients with limited financial means to volunteer
attorneys. LAC has an Intellectual Property Panel, and eligible clients can be re-
ferred to one of the patent attorneys for advice. These patent attorneys rarely write
patent applications or non-disclosure agreements for these clients. They usually
provide guidance through consultation. Telephone Interview with Candee Good-
man, Director of the Legal Advice Clinics (Feb. 8, 1993).
The Minnesota State Bar Association does not directly run any pro bono pro-
grams, and it does not have any patent law pro bono programs listed in its 1992
Directory of pro bono Opportunities. Telephone Interview with Nancy Kleeman, Di-
rector of Volunteer Legal Services, Minnesota State Bar Association (Oct. 2, 1992).
The American Bar Association encourages and provides support to local and
state Bar Associations that want to establish a pro bono program in their area. At
present there are no patent related pro bono programs listed in their directory of
local programs. Telephone Interview with Dennis Kaufman, Director of the Center
for Pro Bono, American Bar Association (Feb. 11, 1993).
The Minnesota Inventors Congress serves as a resource center for inventors but
sponsors no sliding scale fee or free patent application preparation program. The
Minnesota and American Intellectual Property Law Associations have no inventor-
with-limited-financial-means assistance programs. This information was obtained
by calling the organizations' headquarters and asking for information on programs
available for inventors with limited financial means to have patent applications
written free or for a reduced fee.
68. After Kearns demonstrated his invention to Ford representatives on four oc-
casions, Ford "dismissed" Kearns and proceeded to infringe his patents. Kearns' in-
vention was misappropriated even after he had obtained patent rights. Seabrook,
supra note 1 at 44-45. "When Kearns filed suit against the Ford Motor Company, in
1978, Ford did what corporations usually do in patent cases: it began stalling, in the
hope that Kearns would lose heart or run out of money." Id. at 49. By the time
Kearns had received his second favorable judgment against one of the big three
automakers, he had spent $10 million on legal fees. No Shortage of Saviors, WASH.
TmEs, June 14, 1992, p. A14.
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their inventions to many organizations before they raise enough
money to obtain a patent.
To discourage misappropriation, inventors should have each
potential financial supporter sign a non-disclosure agreement prior
to any invention disclosure. Most inventors would have to pay an
attorney to prepare a non-disclosure agreement for them. Inven-
tors with limited financial means may not have the money to pay
an attorney to prepare this agreement. These inventors also may
not have the money to travel to corporate headquarters to convince
executives to support their idea. In addition, these inventors may
not have the money to litigate if a potential financial supporter mis-
appropriates their ideas. Inventors with limited financial means
also may have to pay an attorney to review any agreements a poten-
tial financial supporter asks them to sign. Thus, inventors with
limited financial means in many instances do not even have the
money needed to obtain a legitimate financial supporter.
For inventors who do not have the money which is often
needed to acquire financial support, there are very few options
available to offset the $5,000 minimum cost to obtain a patent. Be-
cause the U.S. patent system does not provide ways for inventors of
limited financial means to obtain patents, these inventors are func-
tionally prohibited from acquiring the right to exclude others from
utilizing their inventions. This prohibition is economic
discrimination.
Part IV. Importance of This Patent System Discrimination
The U.S. patent system's financial discrimination is important
for two primary reasons. First, the patent right to exclude
originates in the Constitution; thus, every American has a right to
an equal opportunity to acquire it. Second, when everyone with a
patentable invention does not have an equal opportunity to acquire
patent rights, the purpose of the patent system is undermined. In-
stead of furthering the advancement of science and technology by
encouraging public disclosure, the patent system discourages public
disclosure among those inventors who are incapable of paying the
fees. 6 9 If there is no incentive to publicly disclose an invention for
69. "All patent attorneys have their indigent, lone inventors. We have never had
to go looking for pro bono publico work. It has always been with us, like the
poor .... " Reilly, supra note 39, at 166, 172 (1983). With the increased fees "the
little inventor will disappear and we will all be losers. Not only patent lawyers. I'm
talking about all the people in the country." Id. at 172-73. "[The new fee bill] will
reduce the number of discoveries and the number of patents... just when we need
them most." Id. at 174. "These tax-fees controvert the purpose of this clause of the
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those who cannot obtain the reward of the right to exclude, society
will lose access to the invention.
Equal rights and equal opportunity are fundamental. The Bill
of Rights was added to the Constitution to ensure that Americans
would not be tyrannized by government; these rights are available
to all American citizens regardless of their financial status. Poor
and wealthy Americans may exercise their rights to vote, freedom
of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from double jeopardy, and
freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. Moreover, there are
many organizations to help the indigent enforce their rights to
these freedoms.70 There is no justification for treating inventors'
"exclusive right[s] to their respective... discoveries"71 differently.
There is no hierarchy of rights in the Constitution; all rights are
primary.
Unfortunately, in practice, patent rights are treated as secon-
dary not only because they are not free to every American with an
otherwise patentable invention but also because those who cannot
pay the fees are prohibited from obtaining them. This situation is
analogous to one in which people incapable of paying a voting fee
are denied the right to cast their ballot. Poll taxes were abolished
so all American citizens would have an equal opportunity to vote.
Congress today would not impose a fee in such a way that every
American citizen did not have an equal opportunity to vote. Be-
cause the Constitution has no hierarchy of rights, the U.S. Patent
System, at the very least, should provide some alternative for in-
ventors with limited financial means and patentable inventions to
acquire patent rights.
Assume for a moment that Congress, via the patent system, is
carrying out its Constitutional mandate to award inventors "the ex-
clusive right to their respective... discoveries." 7 2 Based on this
Constitutional language, by not awarding patents to inventors with
limited financial means, Congress is implicitly making one of two
statements: those who invent and cannot afford to pay the fees are
not inventors, or the inventions of those who cannot pay the fees
are not discoveries and therefore not patentable. The result of
these two statements is the same: regardless of the importance of
their inventions, those who cannot pay the fees cannot obtain pat-
ent rights.
Constitution [Art. I. § 8 cl.8]. They do not promote the progress of science, they stul-
tify it." Id. at 174-75.
70. Some examples of these organizations are the American Civil Liberties
Union, the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, and the Center for Religious Freedom.
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
72. Id.
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There are several requirements for an invention to be "patent-
able."73 If fee payment is considered one of these requirements,
then theoretically the patent system's discrimination is eliminated
because everyone with "patentable" inventions has an equal oppor-
tunity to acquire patent rights. However, this definition of "patent-
able" invention is still functionally contrary to the purpose of the
U.S. Patent System74 because those who cannot pay the Office fees
are discouraged from publicly disclosing their inventions. Regard-
less of how "patentable" invention is defined, in the present U.S.
Patent System those who cannot pay the fees are discouraged from
publicly disclosing because they know their financial status auto-
matically deems their discoveries "unpatentable."
Part V: Minimizing This Discrimination and in the
Process Furthering the U.S. Patent System's
Constitutionally Given Purpose
Decreasing the patent application preparation and Office fees
for inventors with limited financial means will minimize this eco-
nomic discrimination and further the patent system's purpose. The
patent application preparation fees could be reduced by establish-
ing some pro bono or sliding-fee-scale programs for inventors. In
addition, the Office fees could be reduced by eliminating and/or re-
ducing Office costs, establishing sliding scale fees for inventors with
limited financial means, and establishing a monthly payment plan
through which inventors could pay the Office fees.
In order to encourage the development of pro bono programs
among patent attorneys and agents, the Office should require regis-
tered attorneys and agents to donate a designated number of
hours75 per year to performing pro bono work. The Office could
make continued attorney and agent registration contingent upon
the donation of these hours. All registered active status attorneys
and agents would be required to donate pro bono hours and to mail
to the Registration Branch of the Office a verification that they per-
formed their required hours for that year. If attorneys and agents
do not perform the pro bono work, they would lose their active re-
gistration status unless they provided an unavoidable reason for
their lack of performance. The activities that would satisfy the pro
bono requirement would be patent application preparation, patent-
73. See supra notes 27 and 28, and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
75. Ten to twenty hours per year seems a sufficient number of hours to donate
without intruding upon too much of the patent attorneys' and agents' time. In order
to practice Patent Law, attorneys and agents must be registered with the Office.
The attorney's registration status must also be active.
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ability consultations with inventors, patent searching, licensing or
non-disclosure agreement preparation, and any other patent work
that the Registration Branch of the Office approves.
Patent attorneys or agents who could not perform their pro
bono work because there were no inventors with limited financial
means in their area would have an unavoidable reason for non-per-
formance for one year. When these attorneys and agents mail their
form to the Office with their reason for non-performance, their
name would be given to inventors in their area who inquire at the
Office about getting a patent application written. Then, after the
first year, these attorneys and agents should have no trouble find-
ing and performing pro bono work.
Patent lawyer and agent associations should take the lead in
establishing pro bono and sliding-fee-scale programs for inventors
with limited financial means. Bar associations and legal aid orga-
nizations should include patent law in their pro bono and sliding-
fee-scale programs. There are pro bono and sliding-scale legal pro-
grams and organizations that offer assistance in most other fields of
law to clients with financially limited means. 76 No reason exists
why inventors should not have these same types of resources. 7 7
Decreasing the Office fees for everyone, especially for inven-
tors with limited financial means, would also encourage public dis-
closure of inventions. 78 John Reilly, a patent attorney, outlined
some suggestions in a 1983 speech to a joint meeting of the New
York Patent Law and Connecticut Patent Law Associations for de-
creasing the Office costs. 79 Reilly suggests eliminating inter partes
disputes from the Office's jurisdiction.8 0 These disputes include all
interferences, oppositions, and contested reissues.8 ' Reilly advo-
76. Some examples of these organizations are the American Civil Liberties
Union, the Center for Religious Freedom, Legal Aid Society, and the Legal Assist-
ance Bureau.
77. The amount of money required to establish a pro bono or sliding fee scale
Patent Law program depends upon several factors. These factors include the size of
the geographical area to be served, the organization's desired subsidy percentage,
the amount of money raised, the extent of the services the organization wants to
provide, and the availability of attorneys who will work at a reduced rate.
78. Reilly, supra note 39, at 171-75.
79. Id. at 166, 175.
80. Id. at 175.
81. Interference proceedings are initiated when one party or the Office discovers
that at least two inventors are claiming original inventorship of the same items,
processes, or compositions. The Office then conducts a hearing similar to a trial to
determine which party is the first inventor. A reissue occurs when parties have
their patents reexamined to assure, in light of newly found references, that their
patents remain valid. Sometimes other parties oppose or contest these reissues, and
then the Office holds a hearing. BLAci's LAw DIcTIoNARY 562 and 778 (abr. 6th ed.
1991).
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cates requiring the courts to handle these disputes so the Office can
decrease its costs and concentrate on examining patent applica-
tions.82 He argues that the federal courts should handle these dis-
putes because they try at most 350 cases per year "involving the
interests of only several parties," and the Office benefits the whole
country.83 The courts would not be overloaded with interferences,
oppositions, and contested reissues because the parties would initi-
ate these proceedings in their respective federal districts. Not all of
these proceedings would be initiated in the District of Columbia
where the Office resides.
Reilly also suggests eliminating disciplinary proceedings from
the Office. These proceedings should fall under the auspices of the
bar associations.8 4 "It is the duty of the bar associations to disci-
pline attorneys. As to patent agents, who are not members of the
bar, let the Patent Office handle only that."85 Finally, if the Office
continues to settle inter partes disputes, then Reilly advocates
charging those using the Office for these purposes 100% of the ac-
tual cost of these services. Therefore, other inventors, not related to
the disputes, will not have to bear the expense of these dispute
resolutions.86
In general, Reilly emphasizes that all participants in and ben-
eficiaries of the patent system should bear the Office's expenses-
not just the inventors.8 7 The American public benefits from the Of-
fice and the patent system, so it should bear much of the cost.
Reilly suggests: taxing patent attorneys $1000 per person per
year;SS requiring the Office to sell copies of copyrighted patents on
an ongoing basis to increase the Office's revenue;89 and, taxing
every assignment, license, and agreement concerning patents and
requiring all of these documents to be registered.90 Although




86. Id. These inter partes dispute fees should be treated as other Office fees. If
inventors with limited financial means cannot afford the fees, then they should pay
only what they can afford. Those that can afford the fees should pay enough so the
Office recovers 100% of its costs for settling these disputes.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. Presently, the Office only sells copies of patents within a limited time





Reilly's ideas are insightful, they do not provide assistance to those
who cannot afford to pay any Office fees. 9 1
An idea that has not been thoroughly considered is increasing
the flexibility of Office fee payment. The Office should develop a
sliding-fee-scale so that small entities will pay only what they can
afford to pay. Assuring that everyone has an equal opportunity to
obtain patent rights would fully encourage public disclosure of in-
ventions. Increasing the flexibility of fee payment would provide
equal opportunity for everyone to obtain patent rights.92 Increas-
ing the flexibility of fee payment requires providing sliding-scale
rates and an opportunity to pay fees via a periodic payment plan.
A periodic payment plan could, in cooperation with a sliding-
fee-scale, work well in the Office's examining system. Small enti-
ties could have 18 months to pay their patent application filing and
disposition fees, which would be pro-rated by the Office in accord-
ance with ability to pay.93 After 18 months, small entities would
begin making monthly payments toward their utility patent main-
tenance fees if the patent is allowed. If the patent is not allowed,
their financial obligations will have ended.
Usually small entities are better able to make a monthly pay-
ment rather than a lump sum payment. If the monthly payments,
as determined by the inventor's ability to pay, are not made, then
the patent application would be abandoned or the patent would ex-
pire. If the Office bases its sliding fee scale on the ability to make
monthly payments rather than the ability to make lump sum pay-
ments, then it may collect more fees.
However, those who could not make any payments should not
be required to do so to obtain a patent.9 4 Because inventors under
this system might be paying Office fees each month for about 13
years, the financial status of those small entities not paying the full
small entity rate periodically could be reviewed, and payment could
be adjusted accordingly. In addition, misrepresentation of financial
91. Reilly does question why no one has suggested adding a third tier to the Of-
fice fee structure for those who cannot afford to pay any fees. Id. at 171-72. How-
ever, he does not advocate the addition of this third tier.
92. Commentators and the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit have sug-
gested the timing of Office fee payments should be more flexible. See Thomas J.
Kowalski, The Maintenance Fee System and Policy of the Patent and Trademark Of-
fice: Arbitrary, Irresponsible, and In Need of Reform, 30 IDEA 95 (1989); In re
Dubost, 231 U.S.P.Q. 887 (1986). At least one commentator has suggested an in-
crease in the flexibility of the amount of fees paid. See Reilly, supra note 39, at 171-
72.
93. Eighteen months is a typical length of time for patent prosecution.
94. Waiving Office fees would not be a new idea for the Office. The first Commis-
sioner of Patents sometimes waived fees. William I. Wyman, The First Chief of the
Patent Office, 1 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 152, 152-53 (1918).
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status should result in immediate patent application abandonment
or patent expiration. 95
Conclusion
Congress' reorganization of the Office's fee structure to include
a 50% discount for small entities was an initial step in eliminating
the patent system's discrimination against inventors with limited
financial means. However, this initial step is not enough given that
its positive effects were negated by the 1990 Omnibus Reconcilia-
tion Budget Act's 69% surcharge on patent application processing
and patent maintenance fees.
By requiring inventors to pay to obtain patent rights
this is what we accomplish: we stultify the number of disclo-
sures, we stultify the progress of science, we promote the use of
trade secrets, and we force inventors to buy the right the Con-
stitution says they are entitled to have, and then [with mainte-
nance fee payment] we force them to continue to pay to keep the
right alive .... These . . . fees controvert the purpose of this
clause [U.S. Const. Art I, § 8, Cl. 81 of the Constitution. They
[fees] do not promote the progress of science, they stultify it.96
Because payment of these fees is required to obtain patent
rights, the patent system discriminates against inventors with lim-
ited financial means. Inventors who have useful, nonobvious, and
new inventions, still cannot obtain Constitutionally-based patent
rights; whereas, inventors who can pay the fees will obtain these
rights. Inventors in most instances must pay utility patent applica-
tion preparation, and Office processing and maintenance fees. In
order to assist inventors with limited financial means, legal organi-
zations should establish pro bono and sliding-fee-scale programs for
these inventors. The Office should require all registered agents and
attorneys to donate a designated number of pro bono hours in order
to maintain their active registered status, and the Office should im-
plement sliding scale rates and monthly payment plans for small
entities. With these changes, current economic discrimination in
the U.S. patent system could be minimized.
95. Inventors with limited financial means could be required to mail a copy of
their tax returns to the Office annually to verify their financial status.
96. Reilly, supra note 39 at 174-75.
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